An Integral Approach to Science Policy

Author: Michael E. Zimmerman 

Review of Roger A. Pielke, Jr., The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science in Policy and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).   

      Integral Ecology (IE) differentiates between domains of inquiry that are often conflated with one another, such as when the outcome of a scientific or technical study is regarded as providing the best and last words with regard to characterizing and/or offering solutions to an environmental problem.  IE maintains, in contrast, that other perspectives--including cultural/normative views--are needed to provide an adequate understanding of any serious problem.  Scientists can provide important information about what a particular problem is, but people go astray when claiming that such information dictates what policies ought to be established to deal with the problem.  Third-person scientific methods/perspectives cannot displace insights drawn from first- and second-person perspectives.

      In The Honest Broker, Roger A. Pielke, Jr. uses the term “stealth advocacy” to describe the activity of someone claiming to focus solely on science and who is thus supposedly above the political fray, but who in fact works to restrict the scope of choice available to policy makers.  Scientists are tempted, in other words, to hide their value commitments behind their science.  In recent years, debate about complex issues has led to policy gridlock, as advocates on both sides of the issue claim that science supports their point of view.  As Daniel Sarewitz--cited by Pielkes--observes, opponents are all too willing to dismiss each other’s claims as being produced by “junk science,” allegedly flawed because unduly influenced by political, economic, or personal considerations. (6-7, 62) If science becomes too involved in politics, it becomes identified increasingly as the (willing) servant of various interest groups.  If what should be political battles are played out using the language of science, the latter’s usefulness for policy becomes diminished, which is an unfortunate state of affairs.

      Pielke maintains that it is both legitimate and important for scientists to inform the activity of policy making.  Ideally, however, scientists in such situations should be “honest brokers,” rather than stealth advocates.  An honest broker seeks “to facilitate the creation of new and innovative policy alternatives.  Such alternatives have the potential to reshape political dynamics and, in some cases, enable action.” (9) An honest broker, then, seeks to amplify policy options, rather than to narrow them, as in the case of a stealth advocate.

      One of the consequences of post WW II science policy, Pielke writes, is this assumption: if science can reach agreement about an issue, this makes possible political consensus from which policy can follow.  This assumption has often been read as follows: specific knowledge or facts compel certain policy responses on a variety of topics. (12) This assumption has considerable validity when there is political agreement about the issue being studied by science, and when scientific uncertainty about the issue is low.  When the political debate about an issue is spirited, however, and when scientific uncertainty about the issue is high, this assumption is invalid.  Of course, policy makers often turn to science for the “answer,” in order to avoid the consequences of establishing potentially unpopular policies!  Politics, however, differs from policy, in that policy formation follows from political debates, which are informed by sometimes sharply different values and beliefs.  Attempting to bypass political debate, so as to go immediately from scientific findings to policy, leads to technocracy, in which experts determine what is to be done. (34-35)  (Arguably, the counter-cultural revolts of the 1960s and 1970s were in response to a growing technocracy, in which major decisions of all kind were left to the “men in the white coats,” thereby depriving interested parties of having a say in such decisions.  Today, these other voices are called “stakeholders.”)

      Pielke makes the very helpful distinction between tornado politics and abortion politics.  In tornado politics, there is almost unanimous agreement (we all want to survive) and high certainty of a threat to our survival (“Look out the window,” someone yells, “there’s a tornado about to hit our building!”).  Few would want to have a lengthy political debate about the right policy in such a situation: Head for the basement!

      Abortion politics are very different, however.  Here, there are fundamental clashes about morality and values (“life” vs. “choice,” in the current lingo).  No amount of new scientific data will change the minds of opponents, given that the issues at stake are not expressible in terms of scientific data.  Unfortunately, stealth advocates and politicians alike often seek to transform a complex political debate from the status of abortion politics to that of tornado politics. 

      Because nature is rich enough to support a great number of different methods and disciplines, science can support completing, science can support a number of different value-based political positions.  This is certainly the case with regard to the contemporary debate about climate change.  Pielke asserts, strikingly, that in climate politics there is no unbiased science; instead, both sides of the debate view science through the lens of political conflict. (71) Those favoring the view that anthropogenic activity (fossil fuel burning in particular) drives climate change try to frame the issue in terms of scientific certainty (consensus), while opponents of the anthropogenic climate change view call on legitimate scientists who emphasize the uncertainty of any given aspect of the climate change debate.  In such a situation, Pielke maintains that science should play the role of an honest broker, promoting new alternative policy options. 

Pragmatic “no-regrets” interventions tied to clear short-term benefits such as reducing dependence on Middle Eastern oil, advancing economic competitiveness, and reducing particulate air pollution may offer a more effective path to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  Because the benefits of such policies will be felt in the near term, they build a strong basis for continued efforts in the future, and are thus robust to considerations of certainty or uncertainty. And of course, a similar argument can be made about responding to the impacts of climate change, where efforts to reduce vulnerability to disasters will have a clear pay-off in the short term. (73-74) 

      This book contains many other insightful topics that I cannot touch on here.  Suffice it to say that The Honest Broker is imperative reading not only for integral ecologists, but also for anyone interested in understanding the threats posed to the integrity of science, when essentially political debates are carried out in the language of science and in many cases in the persons of scientists who act not as honest brokers, but rather as stealth advocates.  Pielke makes a host of important distinctions about current public debates in which contesting scientific truth claims figure prominently.  Even when a threat is clearly identified, however, science in and of itself cannot tell us what we ought to do. In other words, political situations reducible to “tornado politics” are rare. “Deciding what to do occurs through a political process of bargaining, negotiation, and compromise.  In some cases science is essential to such negotiations, and in other cases it is entirely misplaced.” (137)  

      Have a look at Pielke’s widely consulted blog, Prometheus.